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I. INTRODUCTION

Asked to identify prominent Supreme Court decisions dealing with slavery, most
educated Americans would immediately cite Dred Scott v. Sandford.1 Those who are
more familiar with the Court’s role in the sectional conflict might also remember
Prigg v. Pennsylvania2 and United States v. The Amistad.3 However, I suspect that
only a few specialists would think of Ableman v. Booth.4 Indeed, even those
Constitutional Law textbooks that deal extensively with the law of slavery make at
most passing references to the case.5 Thus, those law students and legal
professionals who do have some familiarity with Ableman would typically associate
the case with the law of federal jurisdiction—the precursor to Tarble’s Case.6
In fact, however, in Ableman the Court became involved in one of the most
dramatic confrontations in the long-running dispute over fugitive slaves. Widelydiscussed at the time, the case involved not only a successful effort by a segment of
the Northern populace to prevent the rendition of an escaped slave, but also the
outright defiance of the federal government by the judiciary of the state of
Wisconsin. Moreover, unlike Dred Scott, the doctrinal framework that underlay
Ableman remains firmly established should be “entrenched” today.
The Article will discuss and analyze the forces that shaped Ableman, the
*

Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University (Camden).

1

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

2

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).

3

40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841).

4

62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).

5

For example, PAUL BREST, ET. AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:
CASES AND MATERIALS 229, 217, 213 (5th ed. 2006), features three slavery-related decisions
as principal cases: Dred Scott, Prigg, and Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).
Ableman, by contrast, is relegated to a brief discussion in a note. Id. at 227. In GEOFFREY R.
STONE, ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 451-453 (5th ed. 2005), Dred Scott and State v. Post,
20 N.J.L. 368 (1845), are principal cases, and Prigg is discussed in one short note. Ableman is
not mentioned.
6

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
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Supreme Court’s disposition of the case, and the aftermath of the decision. The
Article will begin by describing the state of the dispute over fugitive slaves in the
mid-1850s. The Article will then recount the events that brought Ableman to the
Supreme Court and analyze the Court’s opinion. Finally, the Article will discuss the
aftermath and significance of the dispute.
II. THE DISPUTE OVER FUGITIVE SLAVES
While it was by no means a novel concept, the Fugitive Slave Clause7 was the
most unambiguously pro-slavery provision to emerge from the Constitutional
Convention of 1787. To be sure, many commentators have argued that a number of
other sections of the Constitution favored Southern interests.8 However, the Fugitive
Slave Clause was the only provision that explicitly granted slaveowners rights that
they had not heretofore possessed. Under the Articles of Confederation, each state
could, if it wished, free any putative slave found within its borders. By contrast, the
new Constitution both forbade states from declaring escaped slaves free, and
guaranteed slaveowners the right to recover runaways.
Despite its clear pro-slavery orientation, at the time that it was adopted, the
Fugitive Slave Clause was almost entirely uncontroversial. On August 28, 1787,
after the Convention had committed itself to a provision requiring states to extradite
fugitives from justice, Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina moved
to require “fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals.”9 James
Wilson of Pennsylvania observed that “[t]his would [require] the Executive of the
State to do it, at public expence,”10 and Roger Sherman of Connecticut complained
that he “saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a slave or a
servant, than a horse.”11 Butler then withdrew his motion “in order that some
particular provision might be made apart from [the Extradition Clause].”12 On
August 29, his motion to insert a separate clause was adopted without objection,13
and on September 12, the Committee of Style and Arrangement produced language
that was essentially identical to that which is currently in the Constitution.14 After a
minor change in wording on September 15,15 the Fugitive Slave Clause became part
7

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.

8

E.g., Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant
with Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY 188-255 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987); William M., Wiecek, The
Witch at the Christening: Slavery and the Constitution’s Origins, in THE FRAMING AND
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167-84 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds.,
1987).
9
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 443 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966).
10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id. at 453-54.

14

Id at 577.

15

Id. at 628 (“‘legally’ was struck out, and ‘under the laws thereof’ inserted”).
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of the Convention’s proposal without apparent dissent.
This new protection for slaveholders was not a major point of contention in the
struggle over ratification though some Southern federalists did point to the Clause as
a benefit to the South.16 However, the reaction of Northern antifederalists stands in
marked contrast to their treatment of other provisions of the new Constitution that
they viewed as pro-slavery. While Northern opponents of the Constitution
vociferously attacked both the apportionment of the House of Representatives and
the Slave Trade Clause, their reaction to the Fugitive Slave Clause was a resounding
silence.
In 1793, after considerable debate, Congress passed a statute designed to
implement the constitutional guarantee.17 The new federal statute allowed a slave
owner or his agent to seize an alleged fugitive and bring him before either a federal
judge or local magistrate.18 Upon "proof [of ownership] to the satisfaction" of that
official, which could be provided either by affidavit or oral testimony, a certificate
would issue that allowed the removal of the alleged slave to the state from which he
was purported to have fled.19 The statute also provided that anyone who knowingly
and willingly obstructed a claimant in his effort to recover a slave would be subject
to a $500 penalty, payable to the claimant.20
The statute left a number of issues in doubt. For example, it was unclear whether
the owner retained the common law right of "recaption"—the right to reclaim an
escaped slave by self-help and to return the slave to service without the benefit of
government intervention or sanction. Moreover, the statute did not address the
constitutional status of anti-kidnapping or personal liberty laws—state statutes that
imposed additional procedural requirements on those Southerners who sought to
remove alleged fugitives from free states. Finally, the constitutionality of parts of the
federal law itself remained in doubt for much of the early nineteenth century, as antislavery theorists not only claimed that alleged fugitives were constitutionally entitled
to jury trials, but also at times denied that Congress possessed any authority to
enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause.21

16
Kenneth Morgan, Slavery and the Debate over Ratification of the United States
Constitution, 22 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 40, 53 (2001).
17

The background and evolution of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 are described in detail
in Paul Finkelman, The Kidnapping of John Davis and the Adoption of the Fugitive Slave Law
of 1793, 56 J.S. HIST. 397 (1990)(hereinafter Finkelman, Kidnapping); William R. Leslie, A
Study in the Origins of Interstate Rendition: The Big Beaver Creek Murders, 57 AM. HIST.
REV. 63 (1951).
18

Finkelman, Kidnapping, supra note 17, at 419.

19

Id. at 420.

20

Id.

21

See, e.g., SALMON P. CHASE, SPEECH OF SALMON P. CHASE, IN THE CASE OF THE
COLORED WOMAN, MATILDA, WHO WAS BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO, BY WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: MARCH 11, 1837, at 8-9 (Cincinnati,
Pugh & Dodd 1837), available at http://dlxs.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pagevieweridx?c=mayantislavery;idno=07838206;view=image;seq=1 (view each page of the manuscript
by selecting individual pages in the “go to page” dropdown menu).
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In 1842, the Supreme Court confronted these issues in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.22
Prigg was a challenge to the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Anti-kidnapping
Law. Speaking through Justice Joseph Story, a deeply divided Court concluded that
the right of recaption was guaranteed by the Fugitive Slave Clause; that,
notwithstanding the lack of an explicit grant of enforcement authority, Congress
possessed the exclusive power to pass legislation implementing the clause, and that
state personal liberty laws were therefore unconstitutional; that alleged fugitives
were entitled to no greater procedural protections than those established by the 1793
statute; but that state officials could not be compelled to participate in the
enforcement of the federal statute.23
The Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg did not still the ongoing disputes over
efforts by Southerners to recover alleged fugitive slaves. The decision does not seem
to have caused a great stir among the general public. For example, in 1843, the
North American Review asserted that there was “hardly a whisper against the fidelity
and even-handed justice” of the Court’s holding and that the ruling was “received by
the public with the quiet submission which they usually manifest when ordinary
judicial decisions are announced.”24 Those comments that were made immediately
after the decision split largely on sectional lines. For example, the New York Daily
Express complained that “the conclusion to which the Court have arrived involves
consequences which can by no means be satisfactory to this part of the country,”25
and the abolitionist Cincinnati Philanthropist described the decision as “revolting”
and condemned what the newspaper characterized as an assault on state
sovereignty.26 Conversely, without examining Story’s opinion, the Baltimore Sun
declared that Prigg was “all that Maryland can desire, and will be particularly
agreeable to the slaveholders of the South.”27
In some respects, these reactions were entirely understandable. On the specific
22

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).

23

Id. Prigg has been the subject of a large body of scholarly comment. Among the more
notable treatments are: THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF
THE NORTH 1780-1861, at 94-105 (1974); Christopher L. M. Eisgruber, Comment, Justice
Story, Slavery, and the Natural Law Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. CHI.
L. REV. 273 (1988); Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania: Understanding Justice Story’s
Proslavery Nationalism, 2 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 51 (1997)(hereinafter Finkelman, Prigg); Paul
Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph
Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247 (1994)(hereinafter Finkelman, Story);
Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS. L.J. 605 (1993)(hereinafter
Finkelman, Sorting); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Joseph
Story, Slavery, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1086 (1993); Earl M. Maltz,
Majority, Concurrence, and Dissent: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and the Structure of Supreme
Court Decisionmaking, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 345 (2000).
24

5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 543 (1974) (quoting The Independence of the Judiciary, 57 N. AM.
REV. 400, 419 (1843)).
25

2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1936-1918, at
86, (rev. ed. 1987) (quoting NEW YORK DAILY EXPRESS, Mar. 8, 1842).
26

SWISHER, supra note 24, at 544 (quoting CINCINNATI PHILANTHROPIST, Mar. 30, 1842).

27

Id. at 543 (quoting BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 3, 1842).
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issue presented by Prigg on its facts—the question of whether the Pennsylvania antikidnapping law was unconstitutional—the South had indeed won a complete victory.
However, Southerners soon became disenchanted with the regime that the Court had
established. In 1843, taking advantage of one of the implicit suggestions in Justice
Story's opinion the states of Massachusetts, Vermont and Ohio passed laws that
prohibited state officials from participating in the process of returning fugitive
slaves, and also forbade the use of state jails in the process. Pennsylvania followed
suit in 1847, and Rhode Island in 1848.28 The passage of these statutes led one
Southern commentator to complain that “[n]o decision of the Supreme Court of the
Union has produced more evil consequences than [Prigg]. It has embarrassed the
owners of slaves in recovering their property in the free States. It has encouraged the
abolitionists in their efforts to increase those embarrassments.”29
At times, anti-slavery Northerners went even further, mobilizing direct resistance
to efforts by slaveowners to reclaim fugitives. The so-called McClintock Riot of
1847 was particularly well-publicized. In that case, James Kennedy, a Maryland
slave owner, was killed when a group of Carlisle, Pennsylania residents tried to
prevent him and a companion from returning to Maryland with three fugitives who
had escaped to Carlisle.30
Slaveholders viewed such incidents as evidence of Northern disdain for their
constitutional obligations. For example, a Virginia state legislative committee
characterized the new round of personal liberty laws as a “disgusting and revolting
exhibition of faithless and unconstitutional legislation” and as “palpable frauds upon
the South, calculated to excite at once her indignation and her contempt.”31
Similarly, in his Southern Address, John C. Calhoun declared that, as a result of the
actions of the Northern states “the [Fugitive Slave Clause] is now defunct, except
perhaps in [Indiana and Illinois]” and that “the evasion by which it has been set aside
may fairly be regarded as one of the most fatal blows ever received by the South and
the Union.”32
Against this background, Southerners insisted that Congress pass a strengthened
fugitive slave law as part of the Compromise of 1850. The Fugitive Slave Act of
185033 greatly expanded the number of federal officials empowered to act as
commissioners for the purpose of issuing certificates of removal and charged these
officials with the duty of hearing claims of putative masters "in a summary
28

The response of Northern state legislatures to Prigg is described in greater detail in
MORRIS, supra note 23, at 107-29.
29

The Slavery Question, or the Rights and the Union of the States, AM. L.J. 9, 10 (April
1850).
30
This incident is described in detail in, The McClintock Riots (June 2,1847),
http://chronicles.dickinson.edu/encyclo/m/ed_mcClintockriot.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
31

Quoted in STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860, at 14 (1968)(citation omitted).

OF THE

32

6 RICHARD K. CRALLE, THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 290-313 (1851), available at
http://facweb.furman.edu/~benson/docs/calhoun.htm.
33
For accounts of the complex legislative history of the statute, see CAMPBELL, supra note
31, at 15-25; 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY
1776-1854, at 500-08 (1990); MORRIS, supra note 23, at 130-47.
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manner."34 Upon receiving "satisfactory proof" of the validity of the claimant's
assertion of ownership—defined as either a sworn statement taken by the responsible
official himself or a document certifying that appropriate testimony had been given
before an official in the state from which the alleged escape had occurred—the
federal commissioner was to issue a certificate for removal of the alleged fugitive.35
The testimony of the alleged runaway himself was explicitly deemed inadmissible.36
The commissioner was to be paid ten dollars per case if he found for the claimant,
but five dollars if he found against the claimant.37
Once a certificate of removal was issued, no court was allowed to interfere with
the removal of the alleged fugitive.38 The claimant was entitled to enlist the aid of
federal marshals in securing and returning the alleged fugitive to his home state, and
the marshals were to be liable for the full value of any fugitive who escaped.39
Moreover, the commissioners were empowered to summon ordinary citizens to act
as a posse comitatus to apprehend the alleged fugitive.40 Finally, the statute
increased the penalties for those who interfered with the apprehension of alleged
fugitives.41
Many Southerners saw passage of the new Fugitive Slave law as the most
significant concession to the South in the Compromise of 1850. Indeed, in the
Georgia Platform of 1851, a state convention specifically declared that “[i]t is the
deliberate opinion of this Convention that upon a faithful execution of the Fugitive
Slave Law . . . depends the preservation of our much beloved Union.”42 By contrast,
anti-slavery Northerners were outraged by the statute—particularly by its specific
rejection of the use of the writ of habeas corpus and its failure to provide for a jury
trial, even after the alleged fugitive had been returned to the home state of the
claimant.43 To be sure, early in the 1850s most fugitive slaves were recovered under
the procedures established by the statute without incident.44 Nonetheless, Northern
resentment was at times reflected in efforts to free alleged fugitives held pursuant to
the statute, even when the validity of the master's claim was clear. For example, in
1851 mobs facilitated the escape of Shadrach Minkins in Boston and William Henry,
a fugitive slave held in a Syracuse, New York jail.45 An attempt by the Vermont

34

MORRIS, supra note 23, at 146.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id. at 145.

41

Id. at 146.

42

DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 128 (1976)(citation omitted).

43

See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 23, at 163-65.

44

FREEHLING, supra note 33, at 536.

45

CAMPBELL, supra note 31, at 154-57.
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state legislature to nullify the statute further infuriated Southern representatives.46
Although on its face dealing only with the issue of slavery in the territories, the
acrimonious dispute over the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 further emboldened the
critics of the Fugitive Slave Act in the North. The passage of the statute permanently
transformed the national political structure, leading to the dissolution of the Whig
party and the formation of a broad-based coalition of former Whigs, Democrats and
Free Soilers in the North, organized around opposition to slavery and the so-called
“Slave Power,” which soon became known as the Republican party.47 The creation
of this organization and the anti-Southern feeling that it embodied provided
additional impetus for those who opposed enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.
These events provided the backdrop for the dispute that ultimately reached the
Supreme Court in Ableman v. Booth.
III. THE ROAD TO ABLEMAN V. BOOTH48
The prelude to the consideration of Ableman began prosaically when a slave,
Joshua Glover, escaped from Bennami S. Garland, his master in Missouri. Glover
then came to live and work in Racine, Wisconsin in 1852. On Friday, March 10,
1854, after receiving the requisite authorization from United States District Judge
Andrew G. Miller, Garland came to Glover's home in Racine and, with the aid of two
Deputy United States Marshals and four assistants, captured Glover after a struggle
and brought him to the county jail in Milwaukee. Glover was held in the jail pursuant
to a Wisconsin statute that required county jails to provide facilities to detain persons
held under federal law.
On March 11, a large group of residents gathered in Racine to protest Glover’s
capture. A committee was chosen to draft resolutions. Among other things, these
resolutions condemned the “kidnapping” of Glover, demanded that he receive a trial
by jury and, asserting that the Kansas-Nebraska Act had repealed “all compromises
heretofore adopted by the Congress of the United States,” characterized the
“Slavecatching law of 1850" as “disgraceful and also repealed.” Copies of the
resolutions were sent by telegraph to Sherman M. Booth, an abolitionist newspaper
editor in Milwaukee. After first printing a run of inflammatory handbills, Booth rode
through the streets of Milwaukee shouting “a man’s liberty is at stake!” and also
reportedly exhorting “freemen to the rescue!”
By two-thirty p.m., a crowd of several thousand people had gathered outside the
jail where Glover was being detained. The crowd passed resolutions which, among

46

See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 1950-53 (1851).

47
There is a vast literature dealing with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and its
impact on the structure of the American political system, particularly in the North. For
different perspectives, see, e.g., WILLIAM GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY,
1852-1856 (1987); MICHAEL HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY:
JACKSONIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 804-834 (1999); POTTER, supra note
42, ch. 7; and SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN
671-704 (2005).
48

The account of the rescue of Joshua Glover is taken from ROBERT H. BAKER, THE
RESCUE OF JOSHUA GLOVER: A FUGITIVE SLAVE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMING OF THE
CIVIL WAR (2006); SWISHER, supra note 24, at 650-73; and A. J. Beitzinger, Federal Law
Enforcement and the Booth Cases, 41 MARQ. L. REV. 7 (1957).
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other things, demanded that Glover receive a trial by jury. A vigilance committee
was also appointed. In the interim, attorneys who had been contacted by Booth
persuaded a local circuit judge to issue a writ of habeas corpus, demanding that
those who held Glover in custody bring him before the judge and justify the decision
to hold Glover. The writ initially was served on Sheriff Herman Page, the county
official who had charge of the jail. Page, however, responded that while Glover was
in the county jail, he was not in Page’s custody. The attorneys then returned to the
circuit judge and persuaded him to issue a second writ of habeas corpus, this time
directed to Deputy Federal Marshal Charles Cotton, who had charge of Glover.
On instructions from Judge Miller, Cotton ignored the writ. Miller also informed
the representatives of the protesters that a hearing on Glover’s status would be held
on Monday morning at ten o’clock, and that “no power on earth could take Glover
from his jurisdiction.” Soon thereafter, one hundred men arrived on a steamboat
from Racine and joined the crowd at the jail, which was addressed by Booth and
other speakers, all of whom stressed the necessity of opposing the enforcement of the
Fugitive Slave Law, but counseled the crowd against breaking the law.
Booth and the remainder of the vigilance committee then left to take tea. In their
absence, the crowd demanded that the jailer surrender the keys. When he refused,
the crowd broke down the door with pickaxes and an improvised battering ram.
They led Glover from the courthouse and, with Booth at his side, Glover was taken
in a buggy to the underground railway station in Waukesha, from where he escaped
to Canada.
Soon after Glover escaped, Garland and the officials who had originally
participated in the seizure of Joshua Glover were charged by the sheriff of Racine
County with assault and battery, and Garland was jailed. Judge Miller ordered
Garland freed on a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that Garland “was aiding the
marshal in the service of a warrant, at the [marshal’s] request.”49 Miller’s anger at
the entire sequence of events was apparent from the language of his opinion, in
which he declared that “I view this [arrest] warrant . . . to have been obtained by an
officious intermeddler, for the same purpose as the habeas corpus—to effect the
rescue of the fugitive Glover”50 and “I cannot but consider the imprisonment of
[Garland], or of the marshal [who was also named in the warrant] a greater outrage
than the rescue.”51
United States District Attorney John R. Sharpstein then lodged criminal
complaints against Booth and nine other leaders of the Glover rescue, alleging that
they had violated the Fugitive Slave Act by aiding Glover in his escape from
custody. When Booth was brought for arraignment before Winfred Smith, a
commissioner for the federal district court, bail was set at $2,000. Booth initially
posted bail through a surety; however, on May 26, at Booth’s own request, the surety
delivered him to the federal authorities, and Booth was remanded to the county jail in
Milwaukee.
By returning to the custody of the commissioner, Booth placed himself in a
position to challenge the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in state

49

Garland v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1318, 1319 (D.C. Wis.1854) (No. 15811).

50

Id. at 1319.

51

Id.
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court. On May 27, he successfully petitioned Justice Abram D. Smith of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Fearing that ignoring the writ
might provoke another confrontation with the citizenry of Milwaukee, Sharpstein
chose instead to appear before Justice Smith and mount a defense at a hearing on
May 29.
At the hearing, Booth was represented by the abolitionist attorney Byron Paine.
Paine first dismissed the claim that the state courts should not under any
circumstances intervene to free a person who was in federal custody. Paine relied
heavily on the justification for nullification initially articulated in the 1790's by
Thomas Jefferson in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. In his argument, Paine
declared that “when the evil spirits of usurpation and oppression enter into and
possess the Federal Power, the States may interpose with such powers as they have
to arrest the progress of the evil.”52 Apparently seeking to distance himself from the
position taken by South Carolina during the nullification crisis of the early 1830s,
Paine also contended that “whatever objections might be urged against the actual
exercise of the right of resistance by the legislative and executive departments of the
State, cannot be urged with equal force against the actions of its Judiciary.”53 He
concluded by asserting that “even if we have no judicial precedents in favor of the
right of the States to protect their people against tyranny and usurpation, it is time
such a precedent should be made.”54
Turning to the merits, Paine relied on the standard anti-slavery critiques of the
Fugitive Slave Act. He argued that Congress lacked constitutional authority to pass
enforcement legislation, that the statute unconstitutionally delegated judicial
authority to commissioners, and that the procedures mandated by the statute violated
the Bill of Rights. Paine also excoriated the Prigg Court, condemning what he
described as “the violence they . . . perpetrate[d] on the established rules of
construction”55 and that Story “labor[ed] to arrive at such a construction as shall best
suit the convenience and accomplish the purpose of the slave-owners.”56
Payne could not have found a more sympathetic ear for his arguments. On June
7, Justice Smith issued a lengthy opinion which concluded that Booth should be
released from federal custody.57 Smith began his opinion by confronting the
assertion that state courts lacked the authority to intervene in favor of a person who
was in federal custody. His response to this argument was two-fold. First, he
asserted that “every citizen has a right to call upon the state authority for protection”
and that “it is the duty of the judicial officer, when applied to, to see that no citizen is
imprisoned within the limits of the state . . . except by proper legal and constitutional
authority.”58 In addition, Smith noted that, while he might have been reluctant to
52
Argument of Byron Paine, in 3 FUGITIVE SLAVES AND AMERICAN COURTS: THE
PAMPHLET LITERATURE, 347-82, at 349 (Paul Finkelman ed.,1988).
53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 355.

56

Id. at 357.

57

In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854).

58

Id. at 21.
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release a prisoner from the custody of a federal judge, he had no such hesitation
about asserting his authority over federal commissioners, whom Smith characterized
as “subordinate and irresponsible functionaries, holding their office at the will of the
federal courts.”59
Turning to the merits of the habeas petition, Smith initially argued that the arrest
warrant under which Booth was being held was fatally defective because it failed to
allege that Garland had claimed Glover, and that Booth was entitled to be released
for that reason alone. Nonetheless, describing the state courts as “sentinel[s] to
guard the outposts as well as the citadel[s] of the great principles and rights which
[the Constitution] was intended to declare, secure and perpetuate”60 and proclaiming
a duty “to interpose a resistance . . . to every assumption of power on the part of the
general government, which is not expressly granted or necessarily implied in the
federal constitution,”61 Smith also mounted a detailed assault on the constitutionality
of the Fugitive Slave Act.
The bulk of the opinion focused on the contention that Congress lacked authority
to provide a mechanism for the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause. Smith
began by decrying increases in federal power generally, declaring that “the last hope
of free representative and federative government rests with the states. Increase of
influence and patronage on the part of the federal government naturally leads to
consolidation, consolidation to despotism and ultimate anarchy, dissolution and all
its attendant evils.”62 After reviewing the sparse discussions of the fugitive slave
issue during the drafting and ratification process, he juxtaposed the Fugitive Slave
Clause with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, with its explicit grant of power to
Congress, concluding that there was not “one word of grant, or one word from which
a grant [of power to legislate with respect to fugitive slaves] may be inferred or
implied”63 and also that “from the known temper and scruples of the national
convention, we may safely affirm, that had it been asked it would not have been
granted, and had it been granted, no union could have been formed upon such a
basis.”64
Smith also concluded that the Fugitive Slave Act ran afoul of the procedural
requirements outlined in the Bill of Rights. He distinguished sharply between
proceedings to extradite fugitives from justice and efforts to recover fugitive slaves,
asserting that in the former, “[j]udicial proceedings have already been commenced,
and [extradition] is but a species of process to bring the defendant into court,”65
while the Fugitive Slave Clause “contemplates a judicial determination of the
lawfulness of the claim which may be made.”66 The latter, he insisted, required the

59
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full panoply of protections normally associated with due process of law, including a
trial by jury.
Smith conceded that his conclusions were inconsistent with the views expressed
by the Supreme Court in Prigg and its progeny. At this stage, however, he was not
defying the Court’s authority. Instead, Smith simply urged the Court to revisit its
holding in Prigg in view of the antipathy toward the Fugitive Slave Act in the North
and what Smith saw as the deficiencies of the reasoning in Justice Story’s opinion in
Prigg itself.67
Justice Smith’s decision was noted widely,68 and, not surprisingly, hailed as a
great victory by abolitionists and more radical elements of the mainstream antislavery movement. The National Era, for example, expressed the hope that “this
example of judicial independence and integrity [will be] followed in all the State
Courts.”69 However, the legal battle in Wisconsin was still in its early stages.
Sharpstein, acting on Ableman’s behalf, quickly petitioned the full Wisconsin
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the order to release Booth. When
the court agreed to hear the case, Sharpstein enlisted the services of Edward G. Ryan,
a distinguished Wisconsin attorney, to represent the federal government.
Ryan mounted a far more sophisticated defense of the federal government’s
position than Sharpstein had originally presented before Justice Smith. Nonetheless,
on July 19, in In re Sherman M. Booth (Booth I),70 the full court affirmed the order
mandating Booth’s release. Justice Smith delivered a long opinion reaffirming the
views that he had expressed on June 7 in even more emphatic terms.71 Chief Justice
Edward V. Whiton and Justice Samuel Crawford joined Smith in concluding that
being held under the authority of a commissioner was not equivalent to being under
the jurisdiction of a federal court, and that therefore the state courts could
appropriately issue a writ of habeas corpus in Booth’s case.72 They also agreed that
the warrant under which Booth was held was fatally defective.73 By contrast, the
court was deeply divided on the question of the constitutionality of the Fugitive
Slave Act.
While agreeing with Smith that the statute was unconstitutional, Chief Justice
Whiton emphasized different considerations. Unlike Smith, who focused primarily
on the argument that Congress lacked authority to pass any enforcement legislation,
Whiton relied entirely on two other contentions: that the statute unconstitutionally
delegated federal judicial power to commissioners, and that it denied alleged
fugitives what Whiton viewed as their constitutionally-protected right to a trial by
jury.74 Whiton asserted that since the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 had not provided
67

Id. at 52.
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for the appointment of federal commissioners, the Prigg majority did not explicitly
pass on the first point. By contrast, Whiton conceded that the jury trial argument had
been implicitly rejected when the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1793
statute in Prigg and Van Zandt. At the same time, he observed that the specific issue
before the Court in Prigg was the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Personal
Liberty Law and declared that “it would be most unjust to [the Supreme] court to
hold that it has decided questions which its judges have not even discussed, and
which have not even been before it for adjudication.”75
Crawford, on the other hand, would have rejected the constitutional challenge to
the Fugitive Slave Act. For constitutional purposes, he saw the reliance on
commissioners in the 1850s as indistinguishable from the use of state officials that
was challenged in Prigg.76 While observing that as an original matter he would have
held that the states and the federal government possessed concurrent authority to
enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause,77 he contended that the constitutional issues
surrounding the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 had been “definitely settled” by Prigg
and its progeny.78
Despite Crawford’s dissent, the order freeing Booth from the custody of the
commissioner was affirmed. Not surprisingly, abolitionists were jubilant about the
decision. Predicting that the case would ultimately find its way to the United States
Supreme Court, the New York Evangelist optimistically speculated that “[w]e have
good reasons for expecting that if the decision of the Supreme Court can be
procured, it will make a decided rent in this oppressive and cruel, if not wholly
unconstitutional enactment.”79 The Boston Commonwealth was more cautious, but
nonetheless upbeat. On the one hand, the Commonwealth described the Supreme
Court as “the agent of the slaveholding power, [which] must be expected to conform
in its decisions to the will of that power.” But the same newspaper hailed Booth I as
the “decision of a highly respectable state court . . . evidence of a tendency towards a
healthy state on this subject” and predicted that “before long the Northern courts
generally will come to the same conclusion; and then, in the face of the mass of
judicial opinion in the largest section of the country, the [fugitive slave law] cannot
stand, but must be materially modified or repealed.”80
It soon became clear, however, that the state court’s decision Booth I would be
only a skirmish in the legal conflict set in motion by the escape of Joshua Glover.
On September 11, noting that similar clashes between state and federal authorities
had occurred in other states, United States Attorney General Caleb Cushing of
Massachusetts wrote that he had decided that the decision should be appealed to the
Supreme Court.81 After the papers were filed, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney
75
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issued a writ of error to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and the state court complied
with the demands of the writ.82
In the interim, it had become clear that, despite its doctrinal and symbolic
importance, the decision in Booth I had not materially changed the legal situation
faced by Booth. On Saturday, July 8, even before the Wisconsin Supreme Court had
rendered its decision, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Booth for
aiding and abetting the escape of Joshua Glover. The grand jury also indicted John
Ryecraft and John Messenger for their roles in the affair. On July 10, Judge Miller
himself issued arrest warrants based on the indictments. Booth was promptly
rearrested on the basis of these warrants.
Now represented by James H. Paine, the father of Byron Paine, Booth once again
petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. However, in
Ex parte Sherman M. Booth (Booth II),83 the state supreme court unanimously
declined to issue the writ. In his concurring opinion, Justice Abram Smith explained
the difference between the two cases, observing that “in [Booth I, Booth] was held
under the process of an officer who had no power to hear and determine upon the
validity of the law, or the allegations of the defendant against its validity. But now
he is held under process of . . . a judicial tribunal, having full power and authority to
decide upon all the questions and allegations presented in his behalf.”84 Under those
circumstances, the court reasoned, considerations of comity required that the action
in the federal court be allowed to proceed to its conclusion without interference from
the state court.
Southerners and their allies were greatly relieved by the decision in Booth II. A
correspondent of the Washington Union, the official organ of the administration of
President Franklin Pierce, praised the Wisconsin Supreme Court for recognizing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts to deal with cases arising under the
Fugitive Slave Law.85 Not surprisingly, those who had supported the decision in
Booth I took a quite different view. On July 15, the Milwaukee News complained
that “[i]t was easy to sit on the bench and solemnly decide the [Fugitive Slave Act
was] unconstitutional and void . . . . But, when . . . Booth applies for the practical
fruits of this solemn adjudication in his favor, the two Judges are seized with a
solemn spasm of ‘comity.’ Although the law is wholly ‘void,’ they can’t venture to
grant a writ of habeas corpus! the unhappy victim must lie in prison as an act of
courtesy!”86
Because Booth was ill, Ryecraft was tried alone in November, 1854. Edward
Ryan once again represented the federal government. Defending Ryecraft, attorneys
George Lakin and Michael Steever appealed to the higher law doctrine, and also
insisted that the burden was on the prosecution to plead and prove that Glover had in
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83

3 Wis. 145 (1854).

84

Id. at 152-53.

85

Fugitive Slave Law and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Wisconsin, DAILY UNION (Wash.,
D.C.), Aug. 6, 1854.
86

MILWAUKEE NEWS, JULY 15, 1854, quoted in Backing Out, LIBERATOR (Boston), Aug.4,

1854.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008

13

96

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:83

fact been a slave.87 In addition, like the defense in the Morris case in 1851, Lakin
and Steever contended that the jury had the right to determine the law as well as the
facts.88
Judge Miller’s charge to the jury on November 18 rejected these contentions and
also left no doubt regarding his views about Ryecraft’s guilt and the actions of those
who had broken into the jail and freed Glover more generally.89 Miller began by
defending not only the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act but also the policy
underlying the law, asserting that it was “effective in carrying out the provisions of
the constitution [and] is equally so in protecting free colored persons from secret or
criminal deportation.”90 He evinced nothing but disdain for the appeal to the higher
law, declaring “[i]f a man willfully violates the laws of his country by the
commission of an offence against those laws, he comes with a poor grace before a
jury of honest men, sworn to render a true verdict according to evidence, with a plea
of ‘higher law’ or ‘rights of conscience.’”91 Miller also brushed aside the assertion
that the members of the jury could act on their own independent interpretation of the
law, stating simply that “[u]nder the judicial system of the United States, [the
members of the jury] take the law from the court in all cases both civil and criminal,
whether it comports with their individual opinions or not.”92
Turning to the facts of the case, Miller stated flatly that the testimony
demonstrated that Ryecraft had been a member of the vigilance committee93 and that
he was “at the jail, working and assisting to break the door of the jail-yard and the
door of the jail.”94 Miller also decried the actions of the members of the committee in
inciting the crowd by describing Garland and the deputy marshals as “kidnappers.”
He noted the following:
If I had ordered the marshal to bring up Glover for hearing, at that time, it
certainly could not have been done. Under the cry of kidnapper the rescue
would have been effected by that excited crowd, and the personal safety
of the officer periled. An offer to the judge of protection would be of little
avail, after a mob was got up by the cry of rescue, and inflamed by that of
kidnapper . . . . This committee was probably the primary cause of that
outrage, and if so, each member of it is responsible for the escape.95
Against the background of this charge, the jury convicted Ryecraft on November
19.
Despite Ryecraft’s conviction, the assertion that the prosecution was required to
87
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plead and prove the fact that Glover was a slave in an action under the Fugitive Slave
Act created some uneasiness among the representatives of the federal government.
Accordingly, in early January 1855, prior to bringing Booth to trial, prosecutors
voluntarily dismissed the indictment against Booth and reindicted him, this time
adding a count charging him with obstructing, resisting and opposing the execution
of federal process more generally. Booth struck back by filing complaints for false
imprisonment in state court against both Miller and Sharpstein, forcing them to post
bail in order to avoid being taken into custody.96
The trial of Booth himself took place in a crowded Milwaukee courtroom from
January 10 through January 13, 1855. Despite Miller’s earlier ruling that issues of
law were matters for the judge rather than the jury, Paine appealed openly to the
concept of jury nullification in his summation. Analogizing the Glover escape to the
rescue of Peter from Herod’s prison by an angel, Paine identified the slave power as
Herod and asserted that “[m]en are now indicted . . . for imitating Angels of God”97
and also proclaimed that “I charge upon this prosecution that they have come into
court before you and confessed that they are engaged in the execution of an infamous
law.”98
Miller, however, was having none of it. He charged the jurors that they would be
committing “moral perjury” if they disregarded his instructions on the law, and also
reiterated his view that the government was not required to prove that Glover had in
fact been a slave.99 Based on this charge, the jury convicted Booth after only eight
hours of deliberations. Booth was not, however, found guilty on all counts of the
indictment; instead, the jury concluded only that he was guilty of aiding and abetting
the escape of Joshua Glover from the custody of the deputy marshals. The jurors
also appended a statement declaring that the following:
Resolved, That while we feel ourselves bound by a solemn oath to
perform a most painful duty, in declaring the defendant guilty of the
above charge, and thus making him liable to the penalties of a most cruel
and odious law, yet, at the same time, in so doing we declare that he
performed a most noble, benevolent and humane act, and we thus record
our condemnation of the Fugitive Slave law, and earnestly commend him
to the clemency of the Court.100
Based on the verdict, after denying defense motions for a new trial, on January
23, Miller sentenced Booth to thirty days imprisonment in the county jail and a fine
of $1,000, and Ryecraft to a term of ten days in jail and a fine of $200.
Assessments of the verdict against Booth and Ryecraft differed widely. Some
saw the decision as a victory for the principle of the rule of law. For example, the
Milwaukee News declared that:
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[w]e rejoice at this verdict, not because this defendant is made to suffer,
but because it is calculated to teach men a fact which they have been too
prone to forget, that we live under a government of law, that our
institutions of freedom rest upon the observance of law, that the rampant
spirit of mob law shall not be tolerated with impunity in the free State of
Wisconsin, that the doctrine of a higher law to justify the disregard of the
allegiance which every citizen owes to his country, is a false doctrine, and
that he who attempts to put it into practical operation is taking a straight
road and a short one to the penitentiary.101
Not surprisingly, anti-slavery activists had a quite different view, characterizing
Booth in particular as a martyr to the cause who was being punished unjustly. On
February 1, the New York Independent proposed that its readers each contribute one
dollar to a fund that would pay Booth’s fine.102 Contributors to the fund included a
number of prominent anti-slavery members of Congress.103
Subsequent events soon raised the profile of the case still further. Seeking to
have their clients freed from custody, on January 26, the attorneys for Booth and
Ryecraft once again petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for writs of habeas
corpus. The following day, the court granted the petition, and the writs were served
on both Ableman and Samuel Conover, the sheriff of the county jail where the two
convicted activists were being held. While specifically declining to acknowledge the
jurisdiction of the court, Ableman replied that he could not produce Booth and
Ryecraft because they were now in the custody of the county sheriff. Conover, on
the other hand, agreed to bring the prisoners to appear before the court in Madison,
Wisconsin.104 On January 30, a crowd of 2,000 supporters marched with Booth and
Ryecraft as they were being taken to the Milwaukee train station for their trip to
Madison.105
The hearing on the petition to free the prisoners was set for February 2.
Sharpstein was notified, but did not appear, apparently unwilling to recognize the
authority of the Wisconsin court to issue the writ.106 After hearing arguments from
the attorneys for the prisoners, in In re Booth and Rycraft [sic] (Booth III), 107 the
three justices of the state supreme court concluded unanimously that both prisoners
should be freed.
The opinions of Chief Justice Whiton and Justice Smith were largely devoted to
defenses of the general proposition that the state courts possessed the power to
interpose their authority to free prisoners held in federal custody. Whiton
proclaimed that “[w]ithout this power, the state would be stripped of one of the most
essential attributes of sovereignty, and would present the spectacle of a state
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proclaiming the allegiance of its citizens, without the power to protect them in the
enjoyment of their personal liberty upon its own soil.”108 Simlarly, Smith declared
that “[t]he power to guard and protect the liberty of the individual citizen is inherent
in every government; one which it cannot relinquish, which was reserved to the
states [and] without which they could not exist, because it is obvious that they could
claim no allegiance or support from their citizens whom they had not the power to
protect.”109
It fell to Justice Crawford to provide the justification for the decision to free
Booth and Ryecraft under the specific circumstances of Booth III. Crawford, who
had voted to sustain the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act in Booth I, was
careful to limit the scope of his analysis in Booth III. He first emphasized that the
state court could intervene only in a case in which the federal court lacked
jurisdiction, noting that “if it had such jurisdiction, it matters not how illegal, unjust
or arbitrary the proceedings in that court may have been, nor how many errors may
have been committed upon the trial; if the court had jurisdiction . . . it is by no means
my duty as a judicial officer of this state, to revise the decision or correct the
errors.”110 Second, he emphasized that, rather than being common law courts of
general jurisdiction, the federal courts had only the “special and limited” jurisdiction
established by statute, and thus that “the facts necessary to give them jurisdiction
must appear affirmatively on the face of their proceedings, and cannot be
presumed.”111
Crawford conceded that some of the counts of the indictments had alleged facts
sufficient to provide the court with jurisdiction to determine if Booth and Ryecraft
had violated the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.112 However, they had not been
convicted under these counts. Instead, their confinement rested solely on the counts
of the indictments that charged that they had assisted Joshua Glover in escaping from
federal custody, but did not specify that allege that Glover had owed service and
labor to Garland. Crawford contended that the statute required such allegations and
that the relevant portions of the indictment had therefore not charged the two
defendants with a federal crime. Analogizing Booth III to a case in which the federal
court had lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Crawford reasoned that
only such a charge could vest the federal courts with jurisdiction to try the cases, and
that therefore the Wisconsin Supreme Court could free Booth and Ryecraft in a
habeas corpus proceeding.113
Crawford was able to characterize his opinion as limited in scope only by
conflating the jurisdictional inquiry with an examination of the merits. The
gravamen of a jurisdictional objection is the claim that the court lacks power to
adjudicate the legal issues that have been brought before it. Yet Crawford did not
assert that the federal district court had no authority to determine whether the
108
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indictment sufficiently alleged a violation of the Fugitive Slave Law. Instead, he
simply concluded that the district court had interpreted the statute incorrectly by not
requiring that Glover’s status be pleaded and proven—a quintessential issue of the
merits.
Moreover, Crawford’s approach was flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ex Parte Watkins.114 There, in holding that the Court would not entertain
a collateral attack on a criminal judgment from a District of Columbia court, Chief
Justice John Marshall had asserted that “[i]t is universally understood that the
judgments of the courts of the United States, although their jurisdiction be not shown
in the pleadings, are yet binding on all the world; and that this apparent want of
jurisdiction can avail the party only on a writ of error...The judgment of [a federal]
court in a criminal-case is of itself evidence of its own legality, and requires for its
support no inspection of the indictments on which it is founded.”115
Not surprisingly, analysis of these legal niceties found little place in the
commentary that followed Booth III. The New York Journal of Commerce, closely
allied with the Democratic party, described the decision as an “utter subversion of
the powers of the Federal Judiciary,”116 and Judge Miller himself warned that “some
state or county judge or state court commissioner may follow this precedent, and
upon some vague notion of the unconstitutionality of acts of Congress, or of error in
the proceedings in this court . . . discharge all the United States convicts and
prisoners from the prisons and jails of the State.”117 By contrast, the staunchly antislavery New York Tribune declared that “[t]he Judges of [Wisconsin] have won a
lasting title to regard and admiration by their late decision in [Booth III] . . . . The
example which Wisconsin has set will be as rapidly followed as circumstances admit
. . . we anticipate a race among the other Free States in the same direction, till all
have reached the goal of State independence.”118
Against this background, federal government officials considered their options.
Since Ryecraft had already been confined in the county jail for ten days, Booth III
had no practical impact on his situation. By contrast, Booth had not yet served the
full thirty day sentence that had been imposed by Judge Miller. In theory, the federal
marshals could have made an effort to rearrest Booth immediately. But this course
of action would quite likely have engendered violent resistance, and in any event the
federal authorities would have had to find some alternative venue in which to
incarcerate him. Thus, the Pierce administration chose instead to appeal Booth III to
the United States Supreme Court.119
The effort to prosecute the appeal met resistance from the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, whose attitude had hardened considerably since the appeal of Booth I the year
before. When the Supreme Court sent its writ of error to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, the state court judges instructed their clerk to ignore the writ and not to record
114
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it in the official records of the court.120 This action was far more extreme than the
actual decision in Booth III itself.121 By refusing to honor the writ of error, the
Wisconsin court essentially asserted the authority to nullify section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1793, which provided for appeals by writ of error. The refusal also
implicitly challenged the premises of the Supreme Court’s famous 1816 decision in
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,122 which had established the Court’s authority to hear and
definitively resolve appeals from state courts. Nonetheless, the Wisconsin courts
continued to receive support and encouragement from at least some elements of the
national anti-slavery movement. For example, the Chicago Tribune declared that
“[w]e owe to the Supreme court of Wisconsin the respect and reverence due to a
judicial tribunal which has had the courage to avow, and will have the virtue to
maintain, the fundamental principles of State Rights and Personal Liberty.”123
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s maneuver ultimately failed in its intended effect
because the Pierce administration had anticipated the ploy and acted in advance to
counteract it. Prior to the issuance of the writ of error Sharpstein, following
instructions from Washington, had approached the clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court and requested an authenticated copy of the record in Booth III. Sharpstein did
not disclose the motivation for his request, and the clerk complied.124 After the state
court refused to honor the mandate of the writ of error, Attorney General Cushing
petitioned the Court to act on the copy of the record that Sharpstein had obtained.
Cushing’s motion provided the Southern justices and their allies with a clear
opportunity to strike a rhetorical blow at those who opposed the enforcement of the
Fugitive Slave Law. Taney and his allies could have proceeded based on the copy of
the record that had been obtained by Sharpstein and justified their action with an
opinion that branded Booth and the members of the Wisconsin Supreme Court as
lawless nullifiers who were prepared to defy even the Supreme Court of the United
States. Instead, the justices proceeded more cautiously.
Speaking for a unanimous Court in May, 1856, Taney did note that the refusal of
the clerk to comply with the writ of error could not prevent the exercise of the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.125 However, he also concluded that “in a matter of so
much gravity and importance,” the Court should not proceed to the merits without
first giving the clerk another opportunity to provide an official copy of the record of
the lower court proceedings.126 Accordingly, the Court issued an order directly to the
clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, mandating that he provide a copy of the state
court record. In a companion opinion, the Court also postponed consideration of the
appeal in the Booth I so that the two cases could be considered together.127 As a
result, the Court would not consider the merits of either case during its 1856 term.
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The decision of the Southern-dominated Court to proceed cautiously in early
1856 may well have been influenced by the uncertainty of the political situation,
particularly in the North. At the time that the Court postponed the decision in Booth,
the emergence of the Republican party as the primary opposition party in the North
was far from certain. The performance of self-identified Republicans in the state and
local elections of 1855 had been uneven at best, and the future of the party seemed
heavily dependent on the course of events in Kansas. While Congress continued to
wrangle over the future of the territory, the winter of 1855-56 failed to produce the
kind of dramatic events that would further galvanize the anti-slavery faithful and
convince wavering Northerners to put aside their previous political differences and
join together in a crusade against the influence of the slave power. If anti-slavery
sentiment could be subsumed in some reconstitution of Whiggery or a Northern
party devoted to nativism, temperance or some other political issue, the possibility of
a renewed accommodation between the sections no doubt seemed very real to some
contemporary observers.128 Against this background, the decision to postpone the
reckoning in Booth may well have been influenced by a desire to avoid roiling the
political waters unduly.
In any event, the arguments in Ableman v. Booth129 were not heard until January
19, 1859, after sectional tensions had been further exacerbated by events such as the
caning of Charles Sumner,130 the decision in Dred Scott and the conflict over the
Lecompton constitution.131 The United States was represented by Jeremiah S. Black,
who served as Attorney General during the Buchanan administration. By contrast,
although the Court was provided with a written copy of Byron Paine’s argument
before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, no counsel appeared on behalf of either Booth
or the state of Wisconsin.
Black was a particularly apt choice to make the case against the intervention of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Four years earlier, while serving on the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, he had delivered a strongly worded opinion refusing to issue a writ
of habeas corpus on the petition of Passmore Williamson, who had been imprisoned
by a federal court after having been alleged to have unlawfully aided in the escape of
a slave.132 Although the full text of his argument in Ableman was never published,
Black was reported to have denounced the actions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in the strongest terms, darkly suggesting that the state judges could be cited for
contempt but “magnanimously” indicating that the government would not pursue
such a course.133
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With the Court dominated by Southerners and Northern Democrats, the outcome
of the case was never really in doubt. In the abstract, Justice Peter V. Daniel of
Virginia might have found the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s perspective on federalism
attractive.134 However, given his strong pro-slavery and anti-Northern views, Daniel
was hardly likely to countenance state interference in a prosecution under the
Fugitive Slave Act. Conversely, despite the fact that Justice John McLean was
strongly opposed to the expansion of slavery and had been a major contender for the
Republican presidential nomination in 1856, he had consistently resisted efforts to
undermine the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.135 Indeed, as recently as 1855,
in Ex Parte Robinson,136 McLean had incurred the wrath of more radical elements of
the anti-slavery movement by ordering the release of a federal marshal who had been
jailed by Ohio officials for rearresting fugitive slaves whom the state courts had
ordered released on a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, in marked contrast to Dred Scott,
Taney was able to rally a unanimous Court behind an opinion reversing the
judgments of the Wisconsin court.137
Taney began by assailing the basic premises underlying both Booth I and Booth
III. Observing that “the paramount power of the State court lies at the foundation of
[both] decisions,”138 he contended:
It would seem to be hardly necessary to do more than state the result to
which these decisions of the State courts must inevitably lead. It is, of
itself, a sufficient and conclusive answer; for no one will suppose that a
Government which has now lasted nearly seventy years, enforcing its laws
by its own tribunals, and preserving the union of the States, could have
lasted a single year, or fulfilled the high trusts committed to it, if offences
against its laws could not have been punished without the consent of the
State in which the culprit was found.139
Taney then turned specifically to the claim that the Wisconsin court possessed
the authority to free Booth from federal custody. On this point, he asserted:
[T]he powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both
exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate
and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and indepently [sic] of each
other, within their respective spheres. And the sphere of action
appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial
process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the line of division
was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye. And the State
of Wisconsin had no more power to authorize these proceedings of its
134
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judges and courts, than it would have had if the prisoner had been
confined in Michigan, or in any other State of the Union, for an offence
against the laws of the State in which he was imprisoned.140
Taney conceded that the state courts had authority to issue writs of habeas corpus
in order to inquire into the reasons that a person was being held in custody and that
the responsible federal officials should provide an explanation in writing. But Taney
also asserted:
[A]fter the return is made, and the State judge or court judicially apprized
[sic] that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States,
they can proceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within
the dominion and jurisdiction of another Government, and that neither the
writ of habeas corpus, nor any other process issued under State authority,
can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties.141
Any errors in the federal proceeding—including jurisdictional errors—could be
corrected only on appeal. Moreover, Taney declared that it was the duty of federal
officials to resist—by force if necessary—any effort to remove a prisoner from their
custody to bring the prisoner before a state court in a habeas proceeding.142
Taney’s critique of the state court’s decision to free Booth from custody did not
rest on a theory of federal supremacy. Instead, the critique was based on what might
be described as a theory of concurrent sovereignty—the view that the state and
federal governments should be viewed as coequal sovereigns, and that, under
principles of comity, each should respect the judicial proceedings of the other. The
same theory would suggest that the federal courts should also generally refrain from
interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings, even in the face of allegations
that the proceedings somehow implicated federal rights.
By contrast, Taney’s response to the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s failure to
comply with the writ of error emphasized the place of the United States Supreme
Court in the judicial hierarchy. After noting that the Constitution’s grant of appellate
jurisdiction by its terms applied to cases from all courts–not simply federal courts143–
he argued that:
it is manifest that [the establishment of] ultimate appellate power in a
tribunal created by the Constitution itself was deemed essential to secure
the independence and supremacy of the General Government in the sphere
of action assigned to it; to make the Constitution and laws of the United
States uniform, and the same in every State; and to guard against evils
which would inevitably arise from conflicting opinions between the courts
of a State and of the United States, if there was no common arbiter
authorized to decide between them.144
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Taney also observed that, when the Constitution was drafted in 1787, “it was
manifest that serious controversies would arise between the authorities of the United
States and of the States, which must be settled by force of arms, unless some tribunal
was created to decide between them finally and without appeal.”145 Finally, after
stating flatly that the Fugitive Slave Act was constitutional and that the actions of the
commissioner in taking Booth into custody were entirely lawful, Taney averred that
“if any argument was needed to show the wisdom and necessity of this appellate
power, the cases before us sufficiently prove it, and at the same time emphatically
call for its exercise.”146
Taney also denied that recognizing the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court
in any way denigrated the sovereignty of the states. He first observed that:
[n]either this Government, nor the powers of which we are speaking, were
forced upon the States. The Constitution of the United States, with all the
powers conferred by it on the General Government, and surrendered by
the States, was the voluntary act of the people of the several States,
deliberately done, for their own protection and safety against injustice
from one another.147
He then argued that:
the highest honor of sovereignty is untarnished faith. And certainly no
faith could be more deliberately and solemnly pledged than that which
every State has plighted to the other States to support the Constitution as it
is, in all its provisions, until they shall be altered in the manner which the
Constitution itself prescribes.148
He further stated that:
no power is more clearly conferred by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, than the power of this court to decide, ultimately and
finally, all cases arising under such Constitution and laws; and for that
purpose to bring here for revision, by writ of error, the judgment of a State
court, where such questions have arisen, and the right claimed under them
denied by the highest judicial tribunal in the State.149
Despite its powerful reassertion of the Supreme Court’s authority over state
courts, Ableman should not be read as an endorsement of a strong vision of federal
power more generally. Indeed, observing that the Court also had the power to
invalidate federal statutes, Taney explicitly noted that “[the] judicial power was
justly regarded as indispensable, not merely to maintain the supremacy of the laws of
the United States, but also to guard the States from any encroachment upon their
reserved rights by the General Government.”150 Thus, although the Supreme Court
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was clearly a department of the federal government that derived its power solely
from the federal Constitution, Taney conceptualized the Court as a neutral arbiter
that was well positioned to mediate conflicts between the state governments and the
other branches of the federal government. It was this function that he viewed as
having been compromised by the actions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the
Booth cases.
Legal scholars have generally heaped lavish praise on Taney’s performance in
Ableman. For example, Charles Warren characterizes Ableman as “the most
powerful of all [of Taney’s] notable opinions,”151 while Carl B. Swisher asserts that
the opinion “marked the Chief Justice at his best”152 and was “thoughtful, measured,
and disciplined to the last degree.”153
By contrast, contemporary responses to the decision were far less uniform. Not
surprisingly, Southerners and Northern Democrats unanimously supported Taney.
Describing the actions of the government of Wisconsin as “totally illegal and
virtually revolutionary,” the Cleveland National Democrat stated, “[W]e trust that
[Ableman] will be read with careful, and in the case of men willing to violate the law
with prayerful attention, for the sound law and truthful doctrines it teaches.”154
Similarly, The States of Washington, D.C. declared that, while Taney had “lived long
and done much for honor and fame,” Ableman was “the summit. He will never
surpass the wisdom and value of [that] opinion.”155 Republicans, on the other hand,
were split. While the Philadelphia North American averred that “[t]he conduct of
the Wisconsin Court was such as to preclude any other decree,”156 the New York
Evening Post complained that “[n]othing more fatal to the reserved rights of the
States, nothing more dangerous to the securities of the individual, can well be
conceived, than the authority claimed for [the federal courts] in the recent decision of
Judge Taney.”157 Predictably, some of the strongest reaction came from the state of
Wisconsin itself. On March 19, the state legislature adopted a resolution
characterizing the decision in Ableman as “an act of undelegated power, and
therefore without authority void and of no force” and declaring that the states “being
sovereign and independent have the unquestionable right to judge [the
Constitution’s] infraction; and that a positive defiance of those sovereignties, of all
unauthorized acts done or attempted to be done under color of that instrument, is the
rightful remedy.”158 Attempts to enforce the Court’s judgment would meet with
much the same defiant attitude.
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The first step in the process was to file the mandate of the Ableman Court with
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Jeremiah Black’s efforts to obtain a copy of the
opinion and mandates from the Court for this purpose provoked a mini-controversy.
When Black requested such a copy from the Clerk’s office on April 26, he was at
first informed that Taney had directed that no copies be given out until the opinion
was officially published.159 Black responded by sending a written protest to the
Clerk demanding the document “[i]n the name and by the direction of the President
and for the public use in a matter of great and pressing importance” and declaring
that “[r]egarding this as a public record I respectfully suggest that I have a legal right
to have it for the purpose referred to.”160 The matter was referred to Taney, who
authorized the release of the opinion to Black on condition that it be used for official
purposes only.161
Black then sent a copy of the mandates to Don A. J. Upham,162 who had
succeeded John R. Sharpstein as district attorney in Wisconsin.163 On September 22,
Upham moved to have the state supreme court file the mandates.164 The makeup of
the Wisconsin court was entirely different from that which had decided the original
Booth cases. In the election of 1855, Orestes Cole had unseated Samuel Crawford–
the lone dissenter in Booth I165 who had written the majority opinion in Booth III.166
In the spring of 1859, Chief Justice Edward Whiton died, and Republican Governor
Alexander Randall chose Luther S. Dixon to replace him. Finally, in the elections of
1859, the voters chose Byron Paine, who had represented Booth,167 to replace Abram
Smith, who had declined to seek reelection. Thus constituted, the court declined to
grant Upham’s motion.168 Only Dixon voted to file the mandate, defending his
position in a long opinion.169 Cole voted not to file the mandate, while Paine recused
himself.170
The significance of this action was largely symbolic; in practical terms, the
critical issue was whether Booth would be rearrested and forced to serve the
remainder of the sentence that had been imposed on him by the federal court.
Upham was leery of provoking renewed unrest and the possibility of provoking a
new confrontation with the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Thus, it was not until March
1, 1860 that Booth was rearrested on Judge Miller’s orders and confined in the
159
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federal customs house in Milwaukee.171 Now represented by Carl Schurz, a young
Republican activist, Booth once again petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a
writ of habeas corpus,172 raising the specter of another potential clash between state
and federal authorities.
Ironically, such a crisis was averted in part because Byron Paine had been elected
to the state court.173 With Paine forced to disqualify himself because of his prior
involvement with the case, the Wisconsin court once again split evenly, with Cole
supporting Booth and Dixon voting to deny the petition.174 As a result, the court
took no action on Booth’s behalf.175
By March 21, Booth had served the full term of imprisonment to which he had
been sentenced.176 Nonetheless, he remained confined in the customs house because
he adamantly refused to either pay the fine which had been imposed or to allow his
supporters to pay the fine for him.177 Seeking to use his imprisonment as a focal
point for continued agitation against the Fugitive Slave Act, Booth penned a series of
widely published letters that bitterly protested both the fact of his imprisonment and
the conditions under which he was being held.178 Adding to the outcry, the
Wisconsin Free Democrat complained that “[Booth] is kept in prison now solely
because the State has failed to vindicate its authority and honor, and redeem the
pledges it has made to protect his liberty” and that “every hour he remains in prison,
while no steps are taken for his release, is a reproach to the Republican party of
Wisconsin.”179
Spurred on by such appeals, a group of armed men forcibly removed Booth from
Federal custody on August 1.180 Booth did not go into hiding; instead, he continued
to address anti-slavery gatherings, at times brandishing a pistol that he referred to as
his “little habeas corpus.”181 After a number of efforts by federal officials to
recapture Booth were thwarted by crowds of armed men,182 he was finally taken back
into custody on October 8, and remained confined in the customs house until, over
the bitter objections of Jeremiah Black, Booth was granted a pardon by President
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Buchanan on the day before the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln.183
IV. EPILOGUE: ARNOLD V. BOOTH
The pardon did not end the legal saga of Sherman Booth. In 1854, Benammi
Garland had instituted a civil suit against Booth for damages under the Fugitive
Slave Act.184 The suit first came to trial before Judge Miller in April, 1855, but the
jury could not agree on a verdict and was dismissed on April 23.185 A new jury was
impaneled on July 5.186 After hearing arguments for two days, the jury was charged
by Miller in terms that essentially directed them to return a verdict for the plaintiff.187
On August 6, Miller entered a judgment against Booth for $1000 plus costs.188
On February 24, 1857, acting on this judgment, the United States marshal seized
a printing press and a portable steam engine belonging to Booth.189 This property
was then sold to Jonathan Arnold, and the proceeds delivered to Garland in order to
satisfy the judgment.190 Booth then brought suit in the state court, seeking to recover
the property.191 Apparently relying on the state supreme court’s decision in Booth
III, the trial court ruled in Booth’s favor, concluding that the judgment could not
legally be enforced because the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional and the
federal district thus had had no jurisdiction over Garland’s original suit.192
When the decision was appealed to the state supreme court, Booth was once
again represented by James H. Paine, who relied heavily on the reasoning of Booth
III in his argument.193 However, in Arnold v. Booth, Orasmus Cole joined Luther
Dixon in holding that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed.194
Speaking for the court, Cole observed that, even without the Fugitive Slave Act, the
federal district court had jurisdiction over Garland’s initial action by virtue of
diversity of citizenship.195 Thus, Cole concluded that, unlike the earlier Booth cases,
the action to recover the property was nothing more than a collateral attack on the
merits of judgment of the federal district court which should not have been
entertained in the state court.196
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The argument on which Cole relied in Arnold was doctrinally unexceptionable.
However, the decision to distinguish Booth III was also no doubt influenced by the
dramatically different political contexts of the two cases. In the middle and late
1850s, when the travails of Sherman Booth had previously been before the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, Republicans had viewed the aggrandizement of state
power as their best defense against a federal government that that they saw as
dominated by pro-slavery interests. By contrast, in the summer of 1861, Republican
Abraham Lincoln held the presidency and was by slave state governments that
defended the right to secede by relying on the same theory of state sovereignty that
had animated the Wisconsin courts in their previous Booth decisions. With secession
now the primary issue facing the country, to have had a state supreme court
dominated by Republicans rely on similar principles in Arnold would have been
awkward at best.
V. CONCLUSION
The long-running clash over the fate of Sherman Booth illustrates the central
reality of the sectional conflict in the late antebellum era. As Carl Schurz would
later recall that, in the late 1850s, “in the North, as well as in the South, men’s
sympathies with regard to slavery shaped and changed their political doctrines and
their constitutional theories.”197 Thus, in Dred Scott, the Southern justices adopted
the state-centered common property doctrine in order to argue that slavery must be
allowed in the territories.198 But in the dispute over fugitive slaves, it was the antislavery forces that exalted the power of the states in the federal union. The actions
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ableman reflect the lengths to which some
Republicans were willing to go in resisting the power of the federal government in
this context.
Of course, the decision of the Southern states to secede after the election of
Lincoln dramatically changed this dynamic. With Lincoln determined to hold the
Union together, the Republican party became known as the party of nationalism. But
this transformation was almost a historical accident; it did not reflect the basic
ideology of either the party itself, or the anti-slavery movement more generally.199
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